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Abstract 
In this manuscript, we aim to reconcile mutually contradictory arguments 
concerning the influence of organizational slack on innovation by taking into 
account the moderating effects of the characteristics of top management teams 
(TMTs). Building on prior upper echelons research, we argue that organizational 
slack positively influences innovation to the extent that the members of the TMT 
have a high level of education, job functions that are output-oriented, or short 
organizational (or industry) tenure. Our argument informs future research on 
organizational slack, upper echelons theory, and the resource-based view. 
Keywords: organizational slack, innovation, upper echelons theory, 
resource-based view 
 
TMTs’ Characteristics, Organizational Slack, and Organizational Performance:  
A Review of Prior Literature  
In this manuscript, we aim to reconcile mutually contradictory arguments on 
the influence of organizational slack on innovation. Organizational slack has been 
defined as a resource whose usage has not been specified (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert 
& March, 1963). Thus, managers are allowed substantial discretion in deciding its 
usage. Some authors argue that organizational slack enables innovation by 
providing resources that managers can use in a flexible way to pursue initiatives 
that have less predictable outcomes (Greve, 2003; Meyer, 1982; Singh, 1986). Most 
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resources are provided to an organization by its stakeholders, who expect 
managers to be accountable for the productive usage of their resources. However, 
by definition, no particular usage is specified for organizational slack. Accordingly, 
organizational slack is used at the managers’ discretion in that managers are not 
accountable for the usage of organizational slack to their stakeholders. Such 
“irresponsible” (Levinthal & March, 1981, p. 309) resources are particularly 
appropriate for the pursuit of innovation, because innovation outcomes are 
typically uncertain and unpredictable. 
Interestingly enough, the high degree of flexibility associated with the 
usage of organizational slack is criticized by those who see organizational 
slack as a source of managerial complacence and inaction, rather than 
innovation (Bromiley, 1991; Latham & Braun, 2009; Palmer & Wiseman, 
1999; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). They argue that organizations with 
organizational slack are insulated or buffered from competitive dynamism 
(Thompson, 1967) because performance decline does not directly threaten 
the survival of organizations with a reserve of resources like organizational 
slack. In other words, managers can use organizational slack to cover 
financial losses, thereby tolerating performance problems. Consequently, 
the more organizational slack there is available, the less likely it is that the 
organization actively pursues innovation: this is because risk-seeking 
behaviors, including innovation, are motivated by an explicit recognition of 
failures (Cyert & March, 1963; Desai, 2008). 
Managerial Discretion 
The stark discrepancy between the two camps of authors indicates that the 
prior work may not have properly considered important theoretical constructs that 
moderate the relationship between organizational slack and innovation. For 
example, organizational slack may have differential influences on innovation, 
depending on some organizational characteristics. In other words, there may be 
some moderators that determine whether organizational slack affects innovation 
positively or negatively. 
A common perspective shared by the mutually contradictory arguments 
described above is that organizational slack enables managerial discretion 
(Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Managerial 
discretion is defined as the “latitude of managerial action” (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987, p. 371). Managerial discretion may be either high or low, 
depending on the characteristics of the task environments, organizations, and 
individuals. Organizational slack is one of the most typical organizational 
antecedents of managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987, p. 385). 
Therefore, it is more precise to argue that the authors disagree on the influence of 
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managerial discretion on innovation, rather than the influence of organizational 
slack on innovation. In other words, it is important to consider how managers’ 
willingness to pursue innovation is affected when they are allowed to exercise a 
high degree of managerial discretion enabled by organizational slack. 
In this manuscript, we propose hypothetical propositions to argue that 
organizational slack differentially influences innovation depending on 
organizational characteristics defined by the top managers’ attitudes toward 
innovation. Our argument is that organizational slack enables a higher level of 
managerial discretion that then allows “managerial predispositions” (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1990, p. 488), which may be either positive or negative toward 
innovation, to be more explicitly reflected in the degree of innovation pursued by 
the focal organization. 
Accordingly, we expect that organizational slack positively influences 
innovation in organizations that are led by innovative or risk-seeking managers. 
On the other hand, conservative or risk-avoiding managers may find excuses to 
avoid innovation when more organizational slack is available, thereby showing a 
negative association between organizational slack and innovation. 
Upper Echelons Perspectives: Top Managers’ Cognition and Values 
We ground our argument on the theory of upper echelons (Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which posits that we can explain organizational 
behavior as well as organizational performance by the top management teams 
(TMTs)’ demographic characteristics. TMTs generally exercise substantial 
influence on organizational decisions. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
their cognitive base and values influence organizational decisions by defining the 
types of information to which TMTs pay close attention, or manners in which that 
information is filtered and selected as important. Unfortunately, cognitive base 
and values are very difficult to measure directly. Therefore, upper echelons 
scholars instead employ the demographic characteristics of TMTs to operationalize 
these theoretical constructs. 
Because we are interested in explaining organizational differences in terms of 
their degrees of innovation, we focus our review of prior work on upper echelons 
research that examines the influence of TMTs on innovation or organizational risk 
taking, rather than upper echelons theory per se. Unfortunately, aside from 
limited exceptions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997; Kimberly & Evanisko, 
1981; West & Anderson, 1996), most upper echelons research examines the 
influences of TMTs’ characteristics on organizational growth, profitability, or 
diversification (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Therefore, our review 
also includes prior work on strategic conformity (Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & 
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Fredrickson, 1993), because the extent to which TMTs adhere to prior decisions or 
to industry norms also influences organizational contexts that either positively or 
negatively influence their pursuit of innovation. 
According to the prior work, the demographic characteristics of TMTs that 
influence innovation include their educational level (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981), functional backgrounds (Chaganti & Sambharya, 
1987; Song, 1982; Strandholm, Kumar, & Subramanian, 2004), and organizational 
(or industry) tenure (Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick et al., 1993; Jackson, 1990; West & Anderson, 1996). 
We discuss them in turn below. 
In this manuscript, we focus our discussion on the central tendency of TMTs 
to exhibit certain similar characteristics (Jackson, 1990), rather than on the 
distribution of each TMT members’ characteristics. Although many prior studies 
have reported that the demographic diversity of TMTs positively influences 
innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Pelled, 
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999; Webber & Donahue, 2001), TMT members who share few 
similarities with each other are less likely to share normative as well as 
cause-effect beliefs (Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1999). Therefore, it 
may not be theoretically appropriate to employ the behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert & March, 1963), which is an underlying theory of organizational slack, to 
explain the influence of TMTs’ demographic diversity. This is because the 
behavioral theory of the firm is essentially a theory of attention (Bromiley & 
Harris, 2014; March, 1981) as is indicated by the fact that one of the key 
theoretical constructs of the behavioral theory of the firm is bounded rationality 
(March & Simon, 1958). That is, the attention of the TMTs is an indispensable 
construct of the behavioral theory of the firm; however, it would be difficult to 
define the “TMTs’ attention” to the extent that the demographic diversity of the 
TMTs is high. The same argument applies to the upper echelons theory because it 
focuses on the demographic characteristics of the TMTs as a proxy variable of the 
TMTs’ cognition (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) or attention (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990). 
Moderating Roles of the Top Management Teams’ Characteristics 
The Educational Level of TMTs and Organizational Slack 
Prior studies have found that the educational level of TMTs is a characteristic 
that has the most direct relationship with innovation. Namely, organizations 
managed by TMTs that have higher levels of education are more likely to adopt 
technological as well as administrative innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; 
Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). 
One explanation underlying this relationship is that a higher educational 
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level is associated with higher cognitive abilities (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). 
Scholars argue that higher cognitive abilities are one of the important enablers of 
an effective search for new technologies, procedures, and knowledge (Cyert & 
March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958), an important antecedent of successful 
innovation. This is because those with higher cognitive abilities can search for 
alternatives across a broader search landscape. A wider search generates more 
promising innovation candidates. Furthermore, higher cognitive abilities enable 
TMTs with higher levels of education to evaluate alternatives more precisely and 
efficiently, increasing the likelihood that successful innovation initiatives are 
identified. 
It may also be possible that the educational level of TMTs positively 
influences innovation by way of the TMTs’ ties to those outside their industry. By 
definition, TMTs with higher levels of education spent a longer time studying than 
TMTs with lower levels of education. Consequently, the former is more likely to 
benefit from a larger alumni network than the latter, which enables TMT 
members to more effectively develop ties beyond their own industries. This 
difference pertains to our discussion because ties beyond the industry boundary 
free the TMTs from the industrial norm that constrains the strategy formulation 
efforts of the TMT (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Accordingly, we argue that 
TMTs with higher levels of education more actively pursue innovation when they 
consider their organizations’ strategies, organizational structures, or 
organizational procedures. 
One of the most frequently cited studies by Bantel and Jackson (1989) 
examines the relationship between the characteristics of TMTs and innovation in 
the context of the U.S. commercial bank industry. They show a statistically 
positive association between executive educational levels and the extent to which 
the executives’ organizations adopt technical/administrative innovation (although 
no statistically positive relationship is observed when administrative innovation 
alone is used as a measure of innovation). Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) observe a 
similar relationship in hospitals: they show a positive association between hospital 
administrators’ educational levels and the degree to which they adopt 
technological and administrative innovation. Building on their findings, we argue 
that TMTs with higher levels of education are more willing to pursue innovation at 
their organization possibly because they recognize more innovation opportunities 
and evaluate innovation alternatives more precisely and efficiently, from less 
constrained perspectives. 
On the contrary, TMTs may be more reluctant to pursue innovation if their 
educational level is lower. As discussed above, conducting a broad search for 
innovation opportunities tends to be more difficult when the TMTs’ cognitive 
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abilities are lower. The local nature of the search may not necessarily mean that 
the search effort by a TMT with a lower level of education is fruitless, because one 
can refine and deepen existing internal knowledge by focusing the scope of search 
locally. However, the expected returns from searching within well-known local 
fields would be modest and rare at best, because the most promising opportunities 
would have already been identified and exploited. In other words, TMTs with 
lower levels of education are more likely to experience a technological stalemate or 
exhaustion (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Mensch, 1979). Consequently, to the extent that 
TMTs with lower levels of education anticipate lower expected returns from their 
innovation, they are more likely to use excess resources for initiatives other than 
innovation. They may use organizational slack for capacity increases (including 
overseas expansion or acquisitions), promotional activities (including consumer 
campaigns and advertisements), or additional hiring, but not for innovation. 
In short, given the differences in terms of search scope, we expect that TMTs 
with different levels of education use organizational slack differently, thereby 
realizing different outcomes. Accordingly, we argue that organizational slack 
differentially influences innovation depending on the TMTs’ level of education. 
More specifically, TMTs that have higher levels of education (and are more 
aggressive toward innovation), allocate more resources for innovation to the extent 
that more organizational slack is available. This is because they always search for 
opportunities to pursue innovation, and the only obstacle for them is a lack of 
available resources. 
On the contrary, TMTs with lower levels of education are reluctant to 
innovate; therefore, increases in organizational slack do not motivate them to 
pursue innovation. As discussed above, their cognitive capacity is insufficient to 
conduct a broad, distant search. Furthermore, organizational slack buffers 
organizations from variations in the external environment (Thompson, 1967), 
further decreasing the interest of these TMTs in external knowledge and 
information. Decreases in expected returns from innovation are followed by actual 
decreases in innovation as available organizational slack increases. 
Put differently, the degree to which TMTs are aggressive (or reluctant) toward 
innovation determines which of the two mutually contradictory arguments on the 
relationship between organizational slack and innovation dominates. Therefore, 
our first proposition is stated as follows. 
Proposition 1: The higher the TMT’s level of education, the more positively 
organizational slack is associated with innovation. 
TMTs’ Functional Backgrounds and Organizational Slack 
As for the functional characteristics of TMTs, authors are particularly 
interested in the distinction between output-orientation functions and 
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throughput-orientation functions when they discuss the influence of TMTs’ 
characteristics on their organizations’ innovation (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This 
distinction pertains to our discussion because those two types of functions differ in 
their inherent degrees of uncertainty. Specifically, uncertainty in terms of 
available information and goal attainment is higher for output-orientation 
functions than for throughput-orientation functions. We argue that this difference 
is reflected in different degrees of risk tolerance inherent in output-orientation 
functions and throughput-orientation functions. 
Output-orientation functions are defined as those functions that “emphasize 
growth and the search for new domain opportunities and are responsible for 
monitoring and adjusting products and markets” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 
199). As such, those functions are most concerned with making sure that 
organizations’ output quality, quantity, and timeliness meet and possibly exceed 
customers’ needs and expectations. Specific examples of output-orientation 
functions include sales, marketing, and research and development (R&D). Due to 
their close attention to external stakeholders—including customers, suppliers, 
distributors, regulators, and competitors—output-orientation functions are also 
called “external operations” (Strandholm et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, the locus of attention of throughput-orientation functions 
is the organization’s internal operation, because they “work at improving the 
efficiency of the transformation process” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 199). 
Therefore, throughput-orientation functions are most closely concerned with 
streamlining internal operational processes and procedures. Examples of 
throughput-orientation functions include manufacturing, process engineering, and 
accounting. As the foregoing discussion indicates, throughput-orientation 
functions are also called “internal operations” (Strandholm et al., 2004). 
The distinction between output-orientation functions and 
throughput-orientation functions is relevant to our discussion because the 
functional experience and job-related perspectives of TMT members strongly 
influences TMT members’ selective perception of information and goal orientation. 
Undoubtedly, what TMT members know and aspire to achieve drives TMT 
members’ decisions about innovation. In other words, TMT members with 
different functional backgrounds are expected to be different in terms of their 
attitudes toward innovation. 
Selective perception, or TMT members’ selective recognition and appreciation 
of information, determines to what extent TMT members with particular 
functional backgrounds search for and identify innovation initiatives. For example, 
TMT members with output-orientation functions are expected to be more attentive 
to information concerning changing customer needs and competitors’ actions. 
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However, in the case of TMT members with throughput-orientation functions, 
information on manufacturing process yields or cost reduction commands more of 
their attention. It is apparent that the output-orientation functions’ locus of 
attention is outside the boundaries of the organizations, while the focus of 
throughput-orientation functions is inside the organization. This implies that the 
former faces a relatively high degree of uncertainty because obtaining precise 
information about customers or competitors can be difficult. The amount of 
available information may also be very limited. On the other hand, the latter—the 
throughput-orientation functions—operate under a relatively low degree of 
uncertainty. Most information about the organization itself is readily available 
and is generally more precise. Given such differences in the degree of uncertainty 
associated with available information, it is highly conceivable that the former is 
characterized by a higher degree of risk tolerance than the latter. Accordingly, we 
argue that managers engaged in output-orientation functions are more willing to 
pursue innovation that may enable drastic increases in their customer 
responsiveness and competitive adaptability. On the other hand, managers 
engaged in throughput-orientation functions are more interested in refining 
(rather than innovating) in incremental manners what they are already doing 
reasonably well. 
TMT members with different functional backgrounds may also have different 
organizational goals to achieve that differentially influence the extent to which 
they pursue innovation. For example, TMT members with an output-orientation 
place more emphasis on achieving customer satisfaction and competitive 
advantage. On the other hand, TMT members with a throughput-orientation 
emphasize meeting budgets and increasing operational efficiency. The difference 
pertains to the extent to which managers engaged in those two types of functions 
are willing to tolerate risks because the degree of uncertainty associated with 
respective goal attainment differs. TMT members with an output-orientation are 
more willing to tolerate risks because satisfying customers and addressing 
competitive threats involve a high degree of uncertainty due to interactions with 
multiple outsiders. No matter how carefully TMT members prepare before 
performing an action, it is very difficult to precisely predict (or control) customers’ 
or competitors’ reactions. Compared to the challenges of output-orientation 
functions, throughput-orientation tasks of streamlining internal operations and 
reducing costs are relatively straightforward and predictable. These tasks are also 
more controllable because they seldom involve substantial interactions with those 
outside the organization. Accordingly, these differences also influence the extent to 
which TMT members with different functional backgrounds are willing to pursue 
innovation. Specifically, managers engaged in output-orientation functions are 
Osamu SUZUKI 
83 
 
characterized by risk-seeking attitudes that allow them to aggressively pursue 
uncertain and unpredictable innovation initiatives, while those engaged in 
throughput-orientation functions are more interested in allocating resources to 
projects with certain and predictable outcomes, including those aiming for 
streamlining internal operations and raising operational efficiency. 
To date, most research that has examined the influence of TMTs’ functional 
backgrounds on organizational performance is concerned with overall 
organizational performance rather than with innovation. The closest studies to 
our particular interest are those that examine the relationship between the 
functional backgrounds of TMTs and their organizations’ strategic orientation 
toward risk-taking and flexibility. Although risks and having a flexible strategic 
orientation is not exactly the same as pursuing innovation, it is fair to argue that 
organizations characterized by such strategic orientations are more likely to 
pursue innovation. 
It has been reported that TMTs whose backgrounds are more oriented toward 
external operations (including marketing, sales, and R&D) are more likely to 
adopt market-focused strategic adaptive responses, which are characterized as 
innovative and risky (Strandholm et al., 2004). Furthermore, the functional 
background of the upper echelons is also shown to be associated with more general 
categories of strategic orientation (Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987). More 
specifically, TMTs whose backgrounds are oriented more toward 
output-orientation functions are associated with the “prospector strategy,” or a 
strategic orientation toward actively pursuing new opportunities through 
adopting innovation (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 1978). 
Accordingly, we expect that TMTs characterized by output-orientation 
functions are more willing to pursue innovation. Conversely, TMTs characterized 
by throughput-orientations functions are expected to be more conservative and 
risk-avoiding, preferring certain and incremental approaches, rather than 
innovation. 
Given the differences in terms of the degree of risk tolerance, we expect that 
TMTs with different functional orientations use organizational slack differently, 
thereby realizing different outcomes. More specifically, TMTs that are 
characterized by output-orientation functions and are more aggressive toward 
innovation allocate more resources for innovation to the extent that more 
organizational slack is available. This is because they always search for 
opportunities to pursue innovation, and the only obstacle for them is a lack of 
available resources. 
On the contrary, we expect that organizational slack would be used to avoid 
innovation to the extent that the internally-oriented and risk-avoiding 
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characteristics of TMTs with throughput-orientation are explicit. Because 
organizational slack buffers organizations from competitive pressures (Thompson, 
1967), internally-oriented and risk-avoiding TMTs would have fewer opportunities 
to be conscious of potential organizational failure (and decline) when more 
organizational slack is available. Because potential as well as actual failure 
strongly motivates one to make risk-seeking choices (Cyert & March, 1963; Desai, 
2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), we expect that organizational slack 
exacerbates the risk-avoiding attitude of TMTs characterized by 
throughput-oriented functions. Accordingly, their willingness to tolerate risks 
associated with innovation is further decreased. In other words, organizational 
slack provides the TMTs with excuses for not taking risks. Therefore, our second 
and third propositions are formally stated as follows. 
Proposition 2: The more strongly the TMT is characterized by 
output-orientation functions, the more positively organizational slack is 
associated with innovation. 
Proposition 3: The more strongly the TMT is characterized by 
throughput-orientation functions, the more negatively organizational slack is 
associated with innovation. 
TMTs’ Organizational Tenure and Organizational Slack 
It is widely known that TMTs with longer organizational (or industry) tenure 
are more willing to maintain current strategy, organizational structure, and 
organizational procedures (Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Hambrick et al., 1993). Accordingly, we argue that they are less willing to pursue 
innovation. There are several reasons for the negative influence of longer 
organizational (or industry) tenure on innovation. 
First, the influence of organizational (or industry) tenure has been explained 
in the literature from the perspective of psychology. Specifically, the longer TMTs 
involve themselves in a certain course of action, the more committed they become 
to it (Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw & Ross, 1989). This is partially because they prefer 
to see themselves as consistent. They also are less willing to admit that they made 
wrong decisions (or at least, they were not able to anticipate that they would have 
to revise their choices later). Innovation requires a considerable degree of change 
in terms of strategy, organizational structure, or routinized processes; however, 
TMTs with longer organizational (or industry) tenure grow increasingly reluctant 
to make those changes. 
Theories of organizational capability or organizational learning also help to 
explain why longer organizational (or industry) tenure inhibits innovation. The 
term “organizational routine” refers to patterned actions or procedures that 
organizational members (including TMT members) follow without conscious 
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decisions or deliberate calculations (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
As such, organizational routines are manifestations of organizational capabilities 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). With organizational 
routine, organizational members can process tasks efficiently and uneventfully. 
That is, organizational members accumulate organizational routines as they gain 
more competence. Because this process of competence building takes time to be 
effective (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), we expect that TMTs with longer organizational 
(or industry) tenure accumulate more organizational routines than TMTs with 
shorter tenure. It may be interesting to consider how this accumulation of 
organizational routines influences TMTs’ attitudes toward innovation. Scholars 
have debated the influence of organizational routines. Although some authors 
have argued that organizational routines are sources of organizational changes 
and flexibility (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Rueter, 1994; Rerup & 
Feldman, 2011), the more widely accepted understanding is that organizational 
routines are associated with stability and rigidity (Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000), antagonists to innovation. 
Accordingly, we expect that TMTs with longer organizational (or industry) tenure 
are less likely to pursue innovation. 
When organizational competence is earned through organizational learning, 
the learning per se may preclude the adoption of innovation. The longer the TMTs’ 
organizational (or industry) tenure is, the more they learn effective approaches to 
manage their organizations or appropriate ways to compete in their industry. That 
is, TMTs become more competent as they learn. However, the competence enabled 
by learning can also be constraining because competent TMTs are less willing to 
search for alternative approaches (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988). 
They feel they already manage their organizations well enough. They may also 
feel that changes would disrupt their organizations. Because longer tenure is 
generally associated with more learning, we expect that TMTs with longer 
organizational (or industry) tenure are more likely to suffer from this competence 
trap (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Furthermore, longer organizational (or industry) tenure may influence TMTs’ 
cognition as well. Innovation requires searching across a broad field of 
alternatives, but “the long-tenured executives may have difficulty envisioning 
anything but the status quo” (Hambrick et al., 1993, p. 404). Likewise, longer 
industry tenure also impedes a new generation of alternatives because learning 
vicariously (Baum, Xiao Li, & Usher, 2000; Bresman, 2013; Posen & Chen, 2013; 
Tuschke, Sanders, & Hernandez, 2014) from competitors’ experiences increasingly 
constrains a TMT’s “strategic frame,” which guides strategy reformulation (Huff, 
1982). In other words, learning that is borrowed from industry peers is 
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constraining because it is “shared or interlocking metaphors or worldviews” that 
industry participants perceive as the taken-for-granted assumptions (Huff, 1982, p. 
125). 
The negative association between longer organizational (or industry) tenure 
and innovation can also be explained by group dynamics in TMTs. The longer the 
TMT members have worked together, the more cohesive they become because 
“strategic issue processing groups are likely to be more heterogeneous early in 
CEO’s tenure and more homogeneous later in his or her tenure” (Jackson, 1990, p. 
365). Consequently, TMTs with longer organizational (or industry) tenure are less 
innovative, because a cohesive network is characterized by a lower likelihood to 
generate innovative knowledge (Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007). 
A high degree of cohesiveness does not necessarily mean that TMT members 
with long organizational (or industry) tenure always share the same opinions. It 
has been reported that the longer the TMT’s tenure is, the more substantially each 
member disagrees on his or her evaluation of achievements resulting from 
innovation initiatives (West & Anderson, 1996). In other words, the longer the 
TMT’s tenure is, the more obstacles they face to identify innovation initiatives that 
satisfy everyone on the TMT. 
To date, not many studies have directly examined the relationship between 
TMTs’ organizational (or industry) tenure and innovation. However, many studies 
corroborate that TMTs with longer organizational (or industry) tenure show a 
higher likelihood to maintain prior strategies, policies, and products, as shown 
below. Specifically, it has been shown that TMTs with longer organizational tenure 
are characterized by strategic persistence, or strategies that conform to the central 
tendencies of their industry (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Likewise, executives 
with longer industry tenure reveal a stronger “commitment to the status quo,” 
indicating that those with longer involvement feel more comfortable with 
maintaining current policies and executive profiles toward the future (Hambrick 
et al., 1993). Furthermore, the organizational tenure of TMTs is also negatively 
associated with strategic changes in terms of the degree of diversification across 
product-markets (Boeker, 1997). Although most prior studies have shown a 
negative linear relationship between the organizational (or industry) tenure of 
TMTs and organizational change (or flexibility), one study reports a curvilinear 
(U-shaped) relationship between the organizational tenure of TMTs and their 
strategic conformity (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). 
Given that long-tenured TMTs are reluctant to change the status quo, we 
argue that the negative influences of organizational slack on innovation would be 
dominant to the extent that TMTs’ organizational (or industrial) tenure is longer. 
Organizational slack is an indication of the appropriateness of prior choices 
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because organizational slack is accumulated via prior successes (Cyert & March, 
1963). Therefore, TMTs with a strong commitment to the status quo would find it 
easier to legitimize their choices to maintain the current strategy or 
organizational structure when more organizational slack is available. In other 
words, TMTs with longer organizational (or industry) tenure use organizational 
slack to maintain the status quo. 
However, TMTs that have shorter organizational (or industry) tenure (and 
are more aggressive toward innovation) allocate more resources for innovation to 
the extent that more organizational slack is available. For those TMTs that always 
search for opportunities to pursue innovation, the only obstacle is a lack of 
available resources. 
Proposition 4: The longer the TMT’s organizational tenure, the more 
negatively organizational slack is associated with innovation. 
Discussion 
Our first contribution in this manuscript is that we have reconciled mutually 
contradictory arguments concerning the influence of organizational slack on 
innovation. Organizational theory scholars argue that there is a positive 
relationship by emphasizing the flexibility enabled by organizational slack 
(Greve, 2003; Meyer, 1982; Singh, 1986). Others, particularly agency theory 
scholars, oppose this view by arguing that organizational slack renders 
organizations complacent, irresponsive to competitive threats, and risk-avoiding 
(Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To date, efforts to reconcile these 
arguments have been insufficient. In this manuscript, we try to accommodate 
these two perspectives by employing the upper echelons theory. Given that the 
behavioral theory of the firm is essentially a theory about the attention of the 
TMTs (Bromiley & Harris, 2014; March, 1981), it would be inaccurate to explain 
the influences of organizational slack without properly taking the TMTs’ cognitive 
base or values into account. In future studies on organizational slack, it is 
imperative to properly controlling for the influences of the TMTs’ demographic 
characteristics. 
A more general implication of our argument is that the characteristics of 
managers determine which aspects of a resource’s performance influences would 
be dominant if the focal resource is characterized by positive as well as negative 
performance contributions. It is clear that managers use resources to realize 
favorable organizational outcomes, rather than favorable performance is 
automatically enacted by resources. In other words, managers with different 
characteristics achieve different performance outcomes even if they use identical 
resources. In particular, when there are resources that can be used in a flexible 
manner for a wide variety of usages, it is reasonable to expect that managers’ 
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influences on organizational performance are substantial. This perspective 
complements a practice-based view that emphasizes the performance contribution 
of “imitable activities or practices, often in the public domain” (Bromiley & Rau, 
2014, p. 1249). The view is motivated by a critique of the resource-based view’s 
exclusive attention to valuable, rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable resources 
(Barney, 1991). Organizational slack may not be particularly rare, inimitable, or 
unsubstitutable. However, we argue that organizational slack enables managers 
with particular characteristics to outcompete via innovation. Likewise, even 
imitable and transferable resources enable a favorable performance if managers 
select appropriate usages. Accordingly, we can refine the central tenets of the 
resource-based view by showing that the VRIO framework (Barney, 2002) may not 
be a very useful tool to explain the performance contribution of resources that do 
not have narrowly designated usages, like organizational slack. The more flexible 
the usage of the focal resource, the more substantially we need to take into 
account the characteristics of the TMTs to complement our evaluation of the focal 
resource in terms of the extent to which it satisfies the VRIO criterion. Therefore, 
future research that employs the resource-based view should be informed by upper 
echelons theory as well as by the attention-based view (Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Li, 
Maggitti, Smith, Tesluk, & Katila, 2013; Ocasio, 1997) because not only the 
demographic characteristics of TMTs but also their locus of attention influences 
the usage of resources. 
Our second contribution is germane to a bridge between the theory of 
organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963; Nohria & Gulati, 
1996; Singh, 1986) and upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). 
Despite a rich accumulation of prior research on the relationship between 
organizational slack and innovation (Greve, 2003; Meyer, 1982; Singh, 1986), very 
few examine the influence of organizational slack by properly taking the 
characteristics of TMTs into account. Because organizational slack is an important 
antecedent of managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), explicating 
the influence of organizational slack on innovation requires properly considering 
TMTs’ “managerial predispositions” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990, p. 488) that 
decide how managers behave when they are allowed to exercise a high degree of 
managerial discretion. On the other hand, the behavioral theory of the firm, and 
the theory of organizational slack in particular, may contribute to the upper 
echelons research by informing how to open up “the proverbial black box” 
(Hambrick, 2007, p. 337) that conceals how the demographic characteristics of 
TMTs influence their attention as well as their interpretation. In other words, our 
argument uncovers a close association between the theory of organizational slack 
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and the upper echelons theory. Although the interaction effects of the TMTs’ 
characteristics and organizational slack are examined (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990), we still have more to understand about how the relationship between 
organizational slack and innovation changes as the TMTs’ demographic 
characteristics vary. In this manuscript, we tried to provide a clue to clarifying a 
mutually enriching relationship between the theory of organizational slack and 
upper echelons theory. 
One way the former informs the latter is via a unique operationalization of 
managerial discretion by using organizational slack as its measure at an 
organizational level. Managerial discretion is one of the most important 
theoretical constructs used by upper echelons scholars, as is shown by studies that 
examine the moderating roles of managerial discretion for the influences of TMTs 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). In most prior 
research, authors have operationalized managerial discretion by employing such 
industrial characteristics as the degree of dynamism and uncertainty that focal 
organizations face (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; 
Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Other authors argue that more macro aspects 
such as a country’s culture or institutions should be considered as a useful 
measure of managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007). However, upper 
echelons research that operationalizes managerial discretion at an organizational 
level is surprisingly limited, although organizational slack is one of the most 
typical sources of managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Rare 
exceptions include Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and Rajagopalan and 
Finkelstein (1992), who try to indirectly operationalize managerial discretion via 
the firms’ strategic orientation. Our use of organizational slack as a measure of 
managerial discretion at an organizational level informs future research that aims 
to examine the effects of varying degrees of managerial discretion in more detail 
by employing a comparison across organizations (rather than across industries or 
countries). 
Thirdly, our arguments indicate an interesting avenue for future research by 
uncovering a complicated relationship between organizational slack and the 
characteristics of TMTs. It is reported that organizational slack moderates the 
relationship between TMTs’ characteristics and organizational performance 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). We extended this argument by uncovering 
another important aspect of this relationship. Namely, the influences of 
organizational slack on innovation are also moderated by the TMTs’ 
characteristics. That is, the extent to which TMTs aggressively pursue innovation 
moderates the relationship between organizational slack and innovation. Prior 
research uncovers that differences in TMTs’ attitudes toward innovation is 
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irrelevant when organizational slack, or managerial discretion, is limited. We 
went a step further to untangle a complicated relationship between organizational 
slack and the characteristics of the TMTs by showing that the influences of 
organizational slack on innovation may be opposite between risk-seeking TMTs 
and risk-avoiding TMTs. One implication of the prior finding is that it is useful to 
increase organizational slack (and managerial discretion) so that the 
characteristics of TMTs are leveraged for positive organizational performance. 
However, we show that more organizational slack is not necessarily better because 
the appropriate amount of organizational slack (in terms of generating more 
innovation) differs to the extent that the characteristics of TMTs are positive 
toward innovation. 
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